Abstract
The past few years have been difficult with a growing number of global conflicts. To make things worse, the pandemic, followed by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, has threatened international peace and security. Security is a subject with an array of hazards that comprises anything from conventional war between two states, asymmetric war, cyber warfare, and even computer viruses. It leads to a rise in demand for security-related goods and services and the involvements of government and business sector. In a broad sense, it establishes a clear relationship between security and economic activity, and the use of economics to defend national interests and produce beneficial geopolitical results. Lately, some analysts have accused China of using its 'debt-trap diplomacy' as part of its 'Belt and Road Initiative' to gain control over strategic infrastructures abroad. In other words, the use of economic tools to achieve strategic goals is 'geoeconomics' (Roberts et al. 2018). Geoeconomics works best in a complex security environment. For example, taking advantage of the chaos in some African nations, Russia is using the Wagner group to take control of valuable natural resources and partnering with African juntas to avoid Western sanctions (Karr 2023a, b). In the variable relationship between international security and geoeconomics, economic interests become the driver when the distance from the home state to the place of interest is far away.
But as the distances reduce, their positions are interchanged with security becoming the locomotive pulling other components of the national strategy. To amplify, in the immediate neighbourhood of a country, security becomes the main component of nations' strategic goals. This chapter aims to explain such inter-linkages and connect the dots between security and economics vis-a-vis geopolitics by drawing examples from some of the major conflicts worldwide. Finally, an attempt will be made to collate the inferences in the concluding section to adumbrate upon the contemporary geoeconomic drivers of international security. Since Africa hosts the maximum number of conflicts, the first part will begin with the African region.
The African Region
Democratic Republic of Congo
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the conflict began between 1994 and 1996 to shelter roughly two million Hutus fleeing Rwanda for fear of retaliation by the Tutsis. Their presence later led to ethnic tension followed by a turf war over the mineral wealth in Eastern DRC. The DRC is a very big country in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in terms of territory and possesses exceptional natural resources. It is rich in minerals like cobalt and copper. Most of the raw material deposits are still untapped worth US$ 24 trillion including the world's largest coltan reserve and a considerable amount of cobalt (GSP Hub n.d.). Fighting continues with regional neighbours jumping into it and many multinational companies trying to extract their share of wealth has driven tens of thousands of people from their homes and could spiral into a wider regional proxy war. Last year, Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi invited Ugandan troops to fight the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) which is an Islamic rebel group based in Uganda and DRC. President also appears to have quietly approved Burundian operations on Congolese soil. This has irked Rwandan President Paul Kagame. Rwanda aspires to wield influence in eastern Congo for economic reasons (Dallaire 2003). Currently, as reported by Gavin, there is persisting insecurity in eastern DRC because of multiple internal actors jockeying for territory and resources (Gavin 2023). Besides, M23, a previously dormant rebel group, which is backed by Rwanda, is wreaking havoc in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The M23 includes ex-Congolese soldiers, many of whom are Tutsis, and is Rwanda's force to extract Congolese resources (Crisis Group Commentary 2023).
South Sudan
The conflict in South Sudan is an internal fight between two main communities Dinka and Nuer, led by President Salva Kiir and his former deputy Riek Machar, respectively. Immediately after its independence in 2011, internal fighting began. The struggle for independence had begun in 1956 and was ethno-religious in content. However, the internal fighting after it gained independence was ethno-political. By the time the peace agreement of 2018 was signed, thousands of lives were lost, and millions were displaced. The main source of revenue of South Sudan comes from its oil exports. It produces around 150,000-170,000 barrels per day. But its actual income is only from around 45, 000 barrels. Rest is shared with the international companies and as fees to Sudan. There are several key players in the oil market in South Sudan including China and India (Mordor Intelligence n.d.). With its oil reserve around 3.5 billion barrels, the third highest in sub-Saharan Africa next to Nigeria and Angola and 90% of oil resources still untapped, South Sudan has great potential and hence attracted attention from outside the country (Irvin-Hunt and Makoni 2022). In the intra-state conflict in South Sudan, the control of natural wealth has become the driving factor. The leaders leading their communities are probably benefitting the most from the ongoing conflict. As reported, both the President and the Vice President are known to have already accumulated a lot of wealth (The Sentry 2016).
The Sahel
The Sahel region is around a 6000-km-long corridor across Africa connecting the Red Sea to the Atlantic with sands to the North and rainforests to the South. One of the key factors driving the current state in the Sahel region is the combination and collision of geography, history, and the creation of a nation-state. Much of the Sahel was under French control and was a trading route for captured ivory, gold, and black slaves from the South to the North and luxury goods from the North to the Southern cities. The region also collided with other spheres of influence like the British expansion in Egypt, Sudan and British Somaliland, Italian controlled Libya, and Spain in Western Sahara. The spheres of influence first translated to administrative regions and later the de facto boundary when most of the countries became independent but did not agree to boundaries forced upon them by their past colonial masters giving rise to rebellion by the oppressed groups, which continues even today (Marshal 2021).
Mali is one such example. Resenting that they were being lumped into a state that they did not recognise and always considered backward, Tuareg, the nomadic tribe from the North, began its rebellion two years after Mail's independence in 1960. This uprising was followed by periodic violence and was brutally suppressed by the Malian Army. The latest rebellion took place in 2012. The key provisions of the peace accord of 2015 remain unimplemented because of several reasons. While the Tuaregs are now sitting on the side of the government, the armed groups, who have signed the peace accord are changing their alliance partners and are yet to be demobilised. Side by side, the rebellion has been hijacked by the jihadi movement spreading to central Mali and other areas (Karr 2023a, b). As if it was not enough, in August 2020, Col. Assimi Goita seized power in Mali, detaining the transitional President Bah Ndaw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane.
While United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which was mandated to provide logistical support to G 5 forces (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad), found it difficult to meet the complex challenges after the French pulled out of Mali in August 2022 in the face of Russian mercenary Wagner group fighting on the side of the government soldiers. Later, as asked by the junta government, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2690, MINUSMA closed on December 31, 2023. Even though Mali by itself is not very rich in minerals, it has the potential to be an important factor in conflict resolution. The Ministry of Mines estimates "Mali has 800 tons of gold deposits, two million tons of iron ore, five thousand tons of uranium, 20 million tons of manganese, four million tons of lithium, and ten million tons of limestone" (International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce 2022). Mali also has gold and deposits of manganese and bauxite, which are used in electronics. The rebel movement in Mali accentuated because of discrimination and oppression. But it is only a matter of time before the armed groups start fighting for the available and untapped natural wealth as a source of income for the continuation of their movement.
Neighbouring Niger and Chad have uranium, from which traces of rare earth materials can be extracted. Uranium from Niger, the world's fourth largest producer, helps the French fuel its nuclear industry. The big challenge for Niger is the number of armed groups that have spilt over from its neighbouring country and are operating from Niger. Such a phenomenon is likely to lead to mistrust between different ethnic groups and end in armed insurrection (Crisis Group Report No. 301/Africa 2021). Besides, sitting bang in the middle of the Sahel, Niger is of great strategic value to the US and France to watch the developments in the North African countries and the Boko Haram in Nigeria (Nunbogu et al. 2018). Amid anti-France sentiment, as French and European troops were pulling out of Mali, the Nigerien government approved a parliamentary bill paving the way for the re-deployment of French counter-terrorism mission and European task force in Niger. Durmaz observed that after pulling out of Mali, Niger seems to have become the oasis of stability for the Western nations. Niger does provide a good opportunity for the West to push its economic interest and increase military footprints as Mali's violence spreads to neighbouring Niger (Durmaz 2022). However, public demonstrations in Niger protesting the presence of French troops were held (Arslan 2022). On 22 December, at the behest of the new junta, France completed the withdrawal of its troops ending years long military support to Niger (Asadu 2023). The strategic location and rich mineral wealth are Niger's strengths but the same strength combined with the threat of the spread of jihadi terrorism from neighbouring Mali makes it vulnerable. Niger is yet another example of international security and geoeconomics feeding on each other. As for Chad, the last remaining hope of Sahel is sitting on a knife edge. Within two years after succeeding his assassinated father, the current President Mahamat seems to have made enough enemies and there is a probability of a military coup. According to Hudson, "Chad's collapse could open a bridge that merges the flow of fighters, weapons, and violence between these two regions embroiled in conflict: a virtual Pandora's box (sic) clear across Africa" (Hudson 2023).
Central African Republic
Conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) is driven by greed and religious distrust. The security situation in CAR is as bad as in Mali if not worse. However, unlike Mali, where the conflict was because of discrimination, in CAR it is apparently because of control over rich mineral resources primarily by Muslim and non-Muslim groups (Bollen 2013). Ever since the country gained independence from France in 1960, the country was gripped by political instability and violence. But the current conflict is sectarian. In the civil war, Seleka, the Muslim majority force from the North, started fighting the government forces led by Francois Bozize who had come to power in a coup in 2003. The terms and conditions of the peace agreement between the two groups largely remained unfulfilled. In 2012, the Seleka began a rebellion, culminating in a coup. In response, another armed group the Christian-majority Antibalaka was formed and the situation spiralled out of control throughout the country with the civilians paying the highest price. Seleka’s rebellion initially was not motivated by religion, but it seemed to have eventually turned that way. As reported, the Seleka rebellion was partially supported by foreign interests looking for CAR's natural resources (Concern World Wide 2022). The former French colony has 470 minerals including diamond, ivory, oil, iron, manganese, uranium, rare timber, and many others. Despite being one of the poorest countries, CAR is known to have the world's largest iron deposit, and diamonds account for half of the country's export earnings. Impressed by India's development and growth model, CAR has invited India to mine its natural resources. CAR has presented an opportunity to India to exchange its technical know-how in exchange for CAR's natural wealth. It is a win–win situation for both (Economic Times 2022). The initial rebellion by the Seleka, which began because of distrust, has now become a clash of religious faith and greed for natural wealth.
A concerning trend in Africa is the active role of jihadi groups and the internationalisation of internal armed conflicts. The assassination attempt on the life of Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari by Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) on 29 December 2022 in Kogi State indicates the resurgence of Islamist militancy (Karr 2023a, b). Over the last decade, the region which produces 55% of global mineral resources has become fertile terrain for geopolitical competition among great powers and for further penetration by middle powers (IISS 2022). For example, China is expanding its military footprints in the Sahel by passing a law in 2015, for the overseas deployment of the PLA (Marshal 2021: 201-235). As mentioned earlier and as reported by Karr, Russia uses the Wagner group and its partnerships with African nations to advance its strategic goals of countering Western influence and re-establishing Russia as a global power (Concern World Wide 2022; Central African Republic: Events of 2022; Karr 2023a, b). The scramble for Africa is characterised by the rise of China; assertive Russia; and emerging powers including Turkey, Brazil, India, Israel, Gulf States, and others besides the traditional powers on the continent including France, Britain, the US, and their allies.
The Middle East
Whether it is Syria, Yemen, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, or even the constant state of conflict between Israel and Lebanon, the entire Middle East is so intrinsically connected that even the smallest incident at the tactical level at any place has the potential to reverberate in escalating to a major conflict forcing even the powerful external powers to join (Phillips 2022). Traditionally, the US has been the biggest role player in the Middle East. But during the war in Syria, Russia has spread its tentacles and now taking advantage of the squabble between Saudi Arabia and the US, China has stepped in too. The visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Saudi Arabia in December 2022 resulted in signing of agreements worth US$30 billion. Earlier, China had signed a 25-year-long strategic cooperation partnership with Iran in March 2021, which is estimated at around US$400 billion (Taneja 2022; Global Times 2022; Quamar 2022: 293-306). Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil producer and the pillar of the petrodollar, is now open to discussion about trade in any currency. President Xi's visit to Saudi Arabia however created tension in Iran. But the recent visit of President Ebrahim Raisi of Iran to China to accelerate the 25-year-long strategic cooperation treaty is expected to smoothen up the rough patches in the bilateral relationship between China and Iran (Faucon 2023). The joint influence of Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia is going to impact the emergence of the new world in West Asia (Omar and Cranny 2023). The latest development can be a challenge to geoeconomic opportunities of the smaller grouping like the I2U2 (IndiaIsrael-US-UAE), which came up post the pandemic (USIP 2022). It is however early to accurately predict its impact on the geopolitics of the Middle East. Moreover, Iran's application to join BRICS, its importance to China's Belt and Road Initiative, and its Free Trade Agreements with Eurasia Economic Union and a few countries of Central Asia is something that needs to be watched out for and has attracted the attention of the West. Over the decades, since a permanent solution to the problems in the Middle East does not seem to be possible, even maintaining a status quo helps the powerful nations in their geopolitical manoeuvre in the region. Because, when a war like the one in Gaza breaks out, there can be dramatic changes in the geopolitics. Therefore, the Gaza War 2023 needs a special mention.
Balancing geopolitical power is always in the national interest. It takes a lot of diplomatic jostling and does not happen overnight. Outbreak of a conflict however changes the trajectory and speed of the geopolitical shift, creating new diplomatic, commercial, and military alliances. On the one hand, there is destruction of life and property and a slump in the economy and there would be a beeline of a few to make a profit from it on the other. The Gaza War that began with Hamas attacking Israel on 7 October 2023 and retaliation by Israel has already forced a great multitude of people to flee their homes. According to a UN report, the domestic economy of the West Bank and Gaza has already shrunk by 4% and GDP is likely to drop by 12% worth 2 billion USD and there would be 61% job loss. By November 2023, more than 35,000 dwelling units were destroyed taking both the West Bank and Gaza back to the period of 2002 (Associated Press 2023; Al Jazeera 2023).
Arms industry benefits from the war economy. Hartung calls these 'merchants of death' and 'war profiteers'. The country that makes the best out of it is the US. According to him, the American arms industry already staggeringly dominates the international market, controlling 45% of global arms sales, which is only likely to grow more in the context of the ongoing wars (Hartung 2023; Wezeman et al. 2023; Butler 2023). Lipton pointed out that "[T]he conflict between Israel and Hamas is just the latest impetus behind a boom in international arms sales that is bolstering profits and weapons-making capacity among American suppliers" (Lipton 2023). According to a survey by the American Friends Service Committee, there are at least 20 companies that have provided Israel with arms and other military equipment for its 'Sword of Iron' operation to attack Gaza, the West Bank, Syria and South Lebanon from October to December 2023. The list of the companies includes at least 18 US, two Israeli and one Japanese company (American Friends Service Committee 2023; GV Wire 2023). Elbit System, an Israeli arms manufacturing company, has produced a new precision-guided 120 mm mortar that killed hundreds of civilians in Gaza and will have a good global market (Al Jazeera 2023). As the war continues and there is no sign of any reprieve other than the temporary humanitarian pause, despite the Security Council Resolution 2728 (2024) demanding immidiate ceasefire, Gaza will remain an open field for competition for those who want to profit from the crisis and feast on the suffering of innocent lives (Cordesman 2023).
Ukraine
Russia invaded Ukraine on 22 February 2022. This war could have been avoided. Ukraine is Russia's red line, and this line was crossed on 21 February 2021 when Medvedchuk, the Chairman of Ukraine's largest opposition group, was placed under house arrest, his assets seized, and his media channel banned (Shuster 2022). There was one year from then until the actual invasion on 24 February 2022 for the international community to step in and address the security concerns of Russia as well as assure Ukraine of the inviolability of its sovereignty. The assistance that has come to Ukraine is not free. The poor civilians have already paid with their lives and the worst is yet to come. This war did not begin because of economics but of security. That Ukraine is Russia's red line is not a new input. Costigliola, the author of Kenann: A Life between the World mentioned that George Kennan, the US diplomat, and observer of the Soviet Union predicted as early as 1948 that Russia would never accept Ukraine's independence (Costigliola 2023).
All the information was available, but the current leadership ignored the prediction and recommendations of Kennan, who doubted if Russia would believe that NATO expansion towards the Russian border, would have no military connotation. Was it by design? Interestingly, the world's arms industry has already thrived in the Ukraine war (Fig. 6.1). Quoting leading Western media, Chaudhury reported that EU officials are upset and alleged that the US is making a fortune out of the war. Phillips also observed that the US defence contractors are expected to be the biggest beneficiary (Roy Chaudhury 2022; Phillips 2022).
The grain deal and Nord Stream are good examples of the interplay between security and geoeconomics. Russia's consent to the Ukraine grain deal is not on humanitarian grounds but to seek opportunities to use it to advance Russian interests. Apart from exporting Russian grain, Russia hopes that because of the war-induced energy crisis, demand for Russian grain will only increase (Zolotova 2022). There are also speculations about Russia taking advantage of the damage to Nord Stream 1&2 which was leaked on 26 September 2022. Nord Stream 1 is around a 1222-kmlong oil pipeline from St Petersburg via the Baltic Sea to north-eastern Germany and Nord Stream 2 was under construction. Russia fulfils almost 40% of the gas requirement of Europe. When the pipelines were damaged, there was speculation on who could be behind the sabotage. While the European leaders blame Russia for causing deliberate leaks, Russia blames the West (BBC News 2022; Gronholt-Pedersen and Pouche 2022).
Since both lines were not running to their full capacity at the time of the blast, and most European nations were building up their gas storage, the immediate impact of the damage was not much. But the long-term consequences of the sabotage will be more for Russia, for which oil is a political weapon too. Although Russia is turning east, the Asian market may not be good enough for Russia to compensate for the loss of the European market. Therefore, why should Russia sabotage the pipeline? According to Seymour Hersh, since Europe is dependent on cheap oil from Russia, depriving Russia of its political weapon will force Europe to support Ukraine. Therefore, a plan to sabotage Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 was hatched in the US in December 2021 two months before Russia invaded Ukraine (Hersh 2023). Meanwhile, President Putin has offered gas to Europe through an intact stretch of Nord Stream 2 and suggested an alternative through Turkey, which would become a gas hub (Nakhle 2022).
Referring to the global impact of the war on international politics, Greminger and Mussa mentioned that the war has had significant global repercussions on many states, their citizens, and regional and international politics. They observed that Latin America and the Caribbean region are feeling the heat of dire economic consequences. The war has helped China, Iran, and Azerbaijan reorient their regional roles, and the European Union and the US are repositioning security and internal affairs (Greminger and Mussa 2022). Despite the loss of lives and destruction, the Ukraine war has become an opportunity for political gain and economic benefit which does not exclude India. For example, India is buying oil at cheaper rates from Russia. In the words of External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar in the Rajya Sabha, “We buy oil from multiple sources, but it is a sensible policy to go where we get the best deal in the interests of the Indian people” (Outlook 2023). Similarly, Verma reported that the "Russian oil sold to India below price cap in buyers' market" (Verma 2022).
The Caucasus
Nagorno-Karabakh was established as an autonomous region by the then Soviet Republic in 1923-home to a 95% ethnic Armenian population within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Post-Nagorno-Karabakh's official declaration to join Armenia in 1988, there were sporadic armed conflicts between both republics but were kept under control by the Soviet Union. However, after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and both Armenia and Azerbaijan achieved statehood, war erupted over control of the autonomous region. Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence in 1991 soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Armenia took 20% of the region in 1994. The recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan on 13 September 2022 over the control of Nagorno-Karabakh is the third one after 2020 (CPA 2023).
As observed by Glantz, the latest offensive was triggered by Azerbaijan when Russia is bogged down in Ukraine (Glantz 2022). Russia's invasion of Ukraine has impacted the power balance in Central Asia. For quite some time, many Central Asian nations have wanted to diversify their trade and decrease their dependence on Russia. Russia would like to retain its geopolitical influence in the South Caucasus by maintaining the status quo in the conflict and playing the role of the mediator. From the Western perspective, recent events in Ukraine and sanctions against Russia allow for more active involvement of the Western countries in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The European Union has been mediating for quite some time to find a peaceful solution to the problem-the dispute over ownership of the autonomous region. The EU has agreed to deploy 100 unarmed observers along with Russian peacekeepers (Krivoshee 2023; Kommersant 2023). It helps the West to decrease its energy dependence on Russia by implementing Caspian energy projects with the participation of Azerbaijan (European Policy Centre n.d.). Meanwhile, reportedly, Kazakhstan received verbal confirmation from Russia to export 20,000 tons of oil to Germany through the Russian Druzhba pipeline (Erozbek 2023). With 80% of Kazak oil flowing to the Russian port Novorossiysk, Russia still exercises leverage over the export of oil from Kazakhstan (Merkel 2023).
The Central Asian countries are trying to diversify their trade while others are looking at the current crisis as a source of economic benefit. For example, Turkey has offered to build a new pipeline to carry oil from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to Europe (Soylu 2022). Currently, after the September 2023 offensive, Azerbaijan has taken full control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region from the ethnic Armenians. Control of the area is likely to alter the power dynamics in the South Caucasus which lies at the crossroads of geopolitical interests of Russia, Turkey, and Western nations (Bigg and Nechepurenko 2023). Being a close ally of NATO member state, Turkey, Azerbaijan,s gas (Azerbaijan is a significant natural gas producer) helps to feed the energy needs of Europe. Reuters reported that after the fall of the Nagorno-Karabakh, the long-standing proposal for the construction of a pipeline from Baku to Tbilisi via the southern Armenian territory as part of the peace treaty has become a reality (Azerbaijan drops Armenian land corridor plan, look to Iran-Aliyev adviser. 2023).
Taiwan
For now, Taiwan is not at war, but it is a potential area for another war because China's invasion of the island cannot be ruled out. After all, the international community failed to prevent the invasion of Ukraine. Besides, Taiwan is not Ukraine to be able to stand up to a military invasion by China. Preparing for that day, Taiwan has increased its defence budget by 14% (reaching 19.4 billion and 2.4% of its GDP). After the meeting between President Biden and the Chinese President, Taiwan has got a few more years of breathing time. As reported, 42% of Taiwan's total export in 2021 was to mainland China and Hong Kong and 22% of total import in the same year was from mainland China and Hong Kong. Besides, many Taiwan-based high-tech companies in chip manufacturing are operating their factories in China. Despite China's military and economic pressure, Taiwan depends more on China for trade than on the US (Cheng 2022; Kucharski 2022; Zhang 2022; Dabbar 2023). Since Taiwan imports all its fuel to power its economy, it is unusually vulnerable to energy risk markets. Taiwan's continued prosperity depends on a stable geopolitical environment (Feigenbaum and Hou 2020). Therefore, while economic interest can be a big driving factor for either initiation or continuation of the conflict, in the case of a war between China and Taiwan, geoeconomics can be a restraining factor.
Conclusion
The intricate relationship between war and economics is unquestionable. Traditionally, countries have gone to war to expand their control over other territories and collect wealth. But the inter se position of the war and economy is interchangeable as both feed on each other. In Africa, the availability of the rich natural wealth brought the countries under colonial rule. After decolonisation, the craving for natural resources remained, leading to several intra-state conflicts. In DRC, the Eastern region is the most contested between DRC and Rwanda-backed M23 rebels. In South Sudan, control of natural wealth has become the driving factor in the infighting among different communities. Besides, like other African countries that are in conflict, the leaders of the two main political parties of South Sudan have already amassed a lot of wealth for themselves.
The Sahel region is amid conflict because of several factors. In Mali, the rebel movement began because of discrimination and oppression. Since the country has the potential for rich mineral wealth, the conflict will soon take a different turn. Central African Republic, which is known for its rich diamonds, gold, oil and uranium, is in the middle of conflict between Muslim and non-Muslim groups. Strategically located Niger is yet another example of international security and geoeconomics feeding into each other. As for Chad, the only remaining hope in the Sahel is sitting on the edge of a knife.
The Middle East is the gateway to Europe. Its strategic location and pool of oil as well as the dynamic of the ever-changing inter-state relationship draw the powerful nations closer. Even a minor conflict unless controlled can easily spiral out of control resulting in a regional war and possibly the next world war. In the name of stability, the rich Western countries always benefitted from the region's infighting with a boost to their arms industry.
Ukraine's war that began because of security reasons is an avenue for political and economic gain. Even though it has temporarily moved outside the world's radar because of the Gaza War, huge damage has been already done. The global impact of the regressing economy has affected Latin American countries and the Caribbean region the most. While thousands of innocent civilians have died, US defence contractors have made a fortune out of the war.
In the Caucus region, the control of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan has altered the power dynamics of the region and side by side it has helped Europe to fill its energy appetite through the new energy corridor. The case of Taiwan is slightly different. Being an emotional issue, despite the odds, China's invasion of Taiwan remains a possibility. However, because of interdependence on each other for economic growth (Taiwan is more dependent on China for energy than the US), geoeconomics is the restraining factor for the likelihood of China going to war against Taiwan.
Ideally no nation would like to fight a war but once drawn into it, war becomes the means for political gain and economic benefits. When conflict is internationalised, international security and geoeconomics become inseparable. The relationship between international security and geoeconomics is dynamic. Depending on the strategic interest of a nation, both change their positions between the locomotive and the cart. Far away from home, economic interest takes the lead. Closer home, security becomes the primary driver with economic interest in a support role. In war, there will be loss of life and destruction but it is also an opportunity for political gain and economic benefit. For instance, in one of the latest examples, analysts felt that when Syrian President Assad allowed foreign aid workers to enter the rebel-held areas post the devastating earth quake in February 2023, either he was expecting something in return, or there was a deal behind the scenes (Perry et al. 2023). Therefore, where there are conflicts, there are opportunities and, as mentioned in Caldwell (1972), the politicians and businessmen profit the most from a crisis.
Major General (Dr) A. K. Bardalai, is a former peacekeeper and currently a Distinguished Fellow of the United Service Institution of India. He holds a PhD in United Nations Peace Operations under the supervision of Professor (Dr) Joseph Soeters, Tilburg University, Netherlands. He was also the former Commandant of the Indian Military Training Team, Bhutan.
