Introduction
The past year has been difficult for the UN. No
sooner did the world come out of the pandemic,
than Russia decided to invade Ukraine on 22
February 2022. Despite the outcry from the world,
the war continues to date2.
Meanwhile, in Africa,
marching orders have been issued to the United
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to close its shop by
the end of the year. DRC followed suit and asked
the UN to expedite the beginning of the phased
withdrawal of the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (MONUSCO) by the end of the year.
As if it was not enough, Hamas surprised the
world by attacking Israel on 7 October 2023. The
retaliation by Israel was as expected. In the Middle
East, there are three peace operations – the United
Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO),
the United Nations Disengagement Observer
Force (UNDOF) and the United Nations Interim
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which are connected to
the Palestinian issue, are still standing. Even after
more than three months, the war is still confined to a limited geographical area until the time of
authoring this article. Hence, there is speculation
on the value of these peace operations acting as a
restraining factor to prevent the escalation of the
conflict to a large-scale conflict. This article will
explore this in the context of the Gaza War.
Background
The Middle East politics and the Palestinian issue
connect UNTSO, UNDOF and UNIFIL. Hence, a
brief historical perspective of their relations with
Palestine will help to better understand their
contribution to preventing the Gaza War from
crossing the escalation ladder.
While attributing the partial success of limited violence to UNDOF and UNIFIL assisted by the OGG and OGL, a question on the role of UN peacekeeping in Gaza as and when there is a ceasefire arises.
UNTSO
UNTSO was the first peacekeeping mission
established on 29 May 1948 tasked to mediate
between Israel and its five neighbours – Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria during and after the
1948 Arab-Israel war.3
The conflict is rooted in
the Palestine problem. However, one day after
the end of the British mandate on 11 May 1948,
the Arab-Israeli war began. The war ended
with a truce to supervise the cease-fire by the
UN Mediator assisted by unarmed military
observers.4 That is how UNTSO, the first UN peacekeeping operation was established on 29
May 1948.5
Later, following the conclusion of the
General Armistice Agreements between Israel
and four neighbouring states, the responsibility
to supervise the Armistice Agreements fell on
UNTSO. After the establishment of UNDOF on
31 May 1974, and UNIFIL in March 1978, UNTSO's
observers were formed into two groups – Observer
Group Golan (OGG) and Observer Group Lebanon
(OGL). OGG and OGL continued their tasks under
the supervision of UNDOF and UNIFIL.6 The main
mandated tasks of UNTSO include reaffirming
the ceasefire in Palestine and assisting parties
in upholding both the ceasefire and General
Armistice Agreements.7
UNDOF
The establishment of UNDOF was preceded
by two important geographical events linked
to the Palestinian issue. The first one was the
deteriorating situation between Israel and
Egypt since the summer of 1956 and Palestinian
fedayeen attacks against Israeli armed forces
from Gaza with support from the Egyptian
government. It was followed by Egypt restricting
Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal and the
Strait of Tiran, followed by Egypt nationalising the
Suez Canal resulting in Israel, the UK and France
devising a secret agreement to take control of
the canal. On 29 October 1956, Israel crossed the
border and attacked Egypt followed by France
and the UK landing troops in the north of the canal on 31 October. The events finally led to the
establishment of the United Nations Emergency
Force (UNEF I).8
The second event was Egypt attacking Israel across the Suez Canal and Syrian forces attacking the Israeli positions on Golan Heights on 6 October 1973. After the war ended, an Agreement on Disengagement between Israel and Syria was signed in May 1974 resulting in the establishment of UNDOF. Unlike UNTSO, the structure of UNDOF is based on armed contingents, but the force is to be used only in self-defence. Additionally, UNTSO observers were assigned to assist UNDOF under the operational control of the Force Commander of UNDOF.9
UNIFIL
UNIFIL is the third peacekeeping mission
established in the context of the inter-state conflict
between Israel and Lebanon which was also
triggered by the Palestinian cause. After Israel was
proclaimed as a state, the non-Jewish community
was forcefully dispossessed and displaced in
the refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza.
Thousands of Palestinians fled to Lebanon.10 Post
the Lebanese Civil War which broke out in April
1975, armed organisations supported by the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) based in
Lebanon, took advantage of the unstable situation
in South Lebanon and launched raids against
Israel. Israel retaliated and invaded Lebanon on the night of 14/15 March 1978.11 On 19 March 1978, the
Security Council adopted the resolution to establish
UNIFIL in South Lebanon.12 Israel invaded Lebanon
again on 5 June 1982, especially targeting PLO camps
in Beirut and South Lebanon. The last major war
between Israel and Lebanon was in July 2006 which
lasted for 34 days. Israel launched the offensive to
recover the soldiers kidnapped by Hezbollah.13
Even after more than a decade of relative peace, both the Hezbollah and IDF remain at loggerheads. For Israel, the threat from its north with the Hezbollah acquiring more advanced weapons, has become real and bigger. Hezbollah's survival depends on its ability to prove to the government of Lebanon and the Lebanese population that only it can defend Lebanon from Israel. Therefore, the presence of a threat factor whether it is triggered by Palestinian armed groups in Lebanon or the need to express solidarity with Palestinian issues keeps Hezbollah relevant. The following section will examine the role of the three traditional peacekeeping missions in the Gaza War.
UNTSO, UNDOF, UNIFIL and Gaza War
Since the establishment of UNTSO, UNDOF and
UNDOF are directly connected to the Palestinian
issue, any incident related to the Palestinian
cause resonates with the functioning of the three
missions.14 With the Gaza War at the centre of
the storm, those nations that can benefit from
instability in the Middle East, are carefully watching
the trajectory of the conflict and waiting outside
the ring for an opportunity to extract the maximum
out of the conflict. Supporting the conflict directly
or indirectly will change the game. At the same
time, successful mediation by a few states to find a solution will help their status in the region.
When the bilateral relations are in a state of deep
animosity, the occurrence of large-scale conflicts
like the Gaza War or the 2006 Lebanon-Israel war
is politically motivated and pre-planned (Hamas
attack on 7 October) and is difficult to prevent from
occurring. As reported by Wimmen and Wood for
Crisis Group, neither the Lebanese state nor UNIFIL
can impose its will on Hezbollah.15 However, even
during a period of instability (not in a state of fullscale war), there are drivers at tactical levels, which
can be triggered by loose armed organisations
and initiate large-scale conflicts unless these are
mitigated immediately. This is what the liaison and
coordination mechanism and operational activities
of UNDOF and UNIFIL supported by the observer
groups of UNTSO are good at (hereafter, UNTSO will
not be mentioned separately as OGG and OGL are
under the operational control of UNDOF and UNIFIL
respectively). Firing across the border, the crossing
of separation lines (UNDOF area of operation) and
Blue Line (UNIFIL area of operation) by civilians,
air space violations by IDF or even Palestinians
protesting near the Blue Line etc. are some such
incidents at the tactical level that can trigger a major
conflict.
During the Gaza War, the established mechanisms
of the missions to mitigate drivers of conflict are
still in place. However, the freedom of movement of
the peacekeepers has been severely impaired either
because of the imminent harm of the war or imposed
by the host states. In the case of UNDOF, within one
day of the Hamas attack, UNDOF's movement has
been restricted by Israel.16 On insistence by UNDOF,
it is gradually returning to the earlier stage and IDF
is communicating with UNDOF to send strategic
messages to their counterparts in Syria. While it is difficult to prove if the communication mechanism
through UNDOF alone can be credited for indirectly
contributing to limiting violence, it will be safe to
assume that it is making a difference. In Syria, the
Druze community is a factor that can influence the
security situation. To cite an example, Hasmonai
from Haaretz reported that after the Hamas attack
on 7 October, Golan Heights Druze sped towards
Israelization.17 Therefore, threats from miscreants
exploiting organised gatherings of the Druze who
reside on both sides of the separation line in divided
villages to express their solidarity with Israeli Druze
can develop into a complicated security situation.
This is not dissimilar to the situation when the
Palestinians demonstrate every year near the Blue
Line. On such occasions, it is the trust imposed on
UNDOF by Israel, Syria and the Druze in the Golan
Heights area that helps to diffuse the situation.
In the case of UNIFIL, most of the border villages
in South Lebanon have been vacated because of
intense shelling by either side (Hezbollah and IDF).
Liaison mechanisms like Tripartite Meetings are
on hold and investigations by the liaison teams
have been curtailed because of the war. While the
fight between Israel and Lebanon may escalate at
any time, until now, the exchange of fire is limited
to the border areas only.18 There can be several
factors that are helping to restrain the escalation
violation. Firstly, Israel does not want to get sucked
into a conflict with Hezbollah on the northern front
and in Syria and feels that countries like France which has channels to Hezbollah can play some
role in influencing Hezbollah not to escalate.19 Since
Hezbollah is not an official party to the conflict
between Israel and Lebanon (SCR 1701), UNIFIL
can communicate only with the Government of
Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the
Government of Israel and the Israeli Defence Forces
(IDF). Therefore, it would be reasonable to conclude
that the presence of the strong French contingent
in UNIFIL motivates France to take this seriously
and would have contributed to the current state.
To this end, cross-border firing that is taking place
until now seems to be calculated only to signal
deterrence.
Secondly, a large-scale conflict is not in the interest
of either Israel or Hezbollah in Lebanon (also in
Syria). Besides, as observed by Sayigh, the Lebanon
war is not imminent because the situation on the
border depends on a mix of political and military
factors primarily connected to the Gaza War.20 In
the case of Israel, san the USA, the entire world
opinion is against what it is doing now.21 Besides,
the gradual increase in Russian military activities
near the separation line (Golan Heights) in Syria is a
deterrence to Israel not to cross the line.22 Therefore,
Israel will be wary of the consequences of collateral
damage to the unarmed observers, the contingents
of the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and, more
importantly, when the peacekeepers come from the
influential TCCs. Similarly, given the current internal
turmoil and near economic paralysis of Lebanon, Hezbollah's status has taken a beating.23 Like Israel,
collateral damage to the UNIFIL contingents will
go against Hezbollah's effort to regain its position.
This is despite the killing of Hamas deputy leader
Saleh al-Arouri and a senior Hezbollah commander
Wissam Hassan Al-Tawil, in the drone attacks
by Israel in Beirut on 2 January 2024 and South
Lebanon on 8 January 2024, respectively.24 Fear of
the consequences of collateral damage applies even
to UNDOF.
Thirdly, at the tactical level, the equilibrium can
be easily disturbed by malicious actions by loose
armed groups, mostly Palestinian terrorist groups
operating from Lebanon, firing rockets into
Israel from South Lebanon. The October 7 attack
probably would have helped Hamas, which has
been building up its military presence in Lebanon
with Hezbollah's help, to increase its influence
on the Palestinian refugees housed in Lebanon's
largest refugee camp of Ain al-Hilweh.25 As told
to me by my interlocutor in Lebanon, increasing
the anti-rocket launching operations has been
able to at least restrict the freedom of movement
of the terrorist groups affiliated with Hamas to
fire rockets into Israel easily. Thereby, at the time
of the ongoing war, the operations of UNDOF and
UNIFIL are likely to have reduced the probability
of triggering large-scale conflict. As I mentioned
earlier, it is beyond the peacekeeping missions to
prevent any full-fledged conflict between Israel and its neighbours which may occur due to political
reasons. That notwithstanding, since there has not
been a major conflict between Syria and Israel since
1974 and between Lebanon and Israel since 2006,
Israel and IDF unofficially acknowledge the positive
contribution of the three peacekeeping missions
in the Middle East.26 While it was not the intent to
overplay the role of the peacekeeping missions in
containing the conflict but to highlight how even
limited contributions of the missions can be useful.
What Next
While attributing the partial success of limited
violence to UNDOF and UNIFIL assisted by the OGG
and OGL, a question on the role of UN peacekeeping
in Gaza as and when there is a ceasefire arises.
Marks reported that the US and European allies
are pushing a plan to deploy a UN peacekeeping
force in the Gaza Strip after the war.27 Deployment
of a peacekeeping force will have to be based on
the consent of the parties to the conflict. Despite
scepticism from Israel on the efficacy of such a
mechanism, it might be possible to motivate Israel
to accede to such a proposal or a neutral force.
Even for Hamas, obtaining consent will take a lot
of diplomatic pushing. Besides the difficulty in
finding an appropriate and acceptable model, this
will be a political hurdle, which is likely to be under
consideration by the UN and those who are lobbying
for some kind of settlement.28 Any force whether it will be unarmed observers,
lightly armed or heavily armed will have to be
seen in the context of its role and consequences
if the ceasefire breaks down. Given the ferocity
of the current violence, finding a force that can
interpose between IDF and Hamas to enforce
peace is impossible. Therefore, the option of
deployment under Chapter VII of the UN charter
can be ruled out. Besides, apart from being seen
as another Western-based threat, a heavily armed
force even under Chapter VI is not likely to be
acceptable. I have alluded to this earlier in the
context of Ukraine.29 As for using force in selfdefence, arming the peacekeepers can help firstly
to the extent that it is psychological and secondly,
the force to hold on to the ground for the barest
minimum time until the force is extricated if there
is a threat to their life. As for the task, supervising
ceasefire agreements, and providing a platform
to keep the dialogue between the parties can help
more to keep the area stable. For this, the UNTSO
model is something that can be considered. The
visit of the UN Under Secretary General for the
Department of Peace Operations Mr Jean-Pierre
Lacroix to all three missions at the beginning of
January 2024 is something to take note of.
The peacekeepers as well as the senior leaders of
the missions reflect the positions of the countries
they come from even if some of them are holding
UN-seconded positions. Therefore, the leader to
head the mission should be carefully selected for
the parties to have trust in his/her professional
ability and impartial thinking. Someone from
the Global South or even a non-controversial
European nation is likely to fit the requirement.
The assessment made in the previous sections
and the idea suggested assumes that the war will be limited to Gaza and there will be an acceptable
political solution to end the conflict soon.30 It
seems that until now, Hezbollah has been showing
more restraint than Israel. Even though, the Gaza
War, by spilling over into the Red Sea, has already
become regional.31 Therefore, one does not know
the limit of the restraint and what might happen
in the days to come.32
